Sept. 1939, merci non

Daniel, je tiens à préciser que dans mon "zero point" (le point de divergence), la France et l'Angleterre ne déclarent pas la guerre et laissent Hitler croquer la Pologne avec Staline. Lord Halifax remplace Chamberlain, Daladier s'appuie sur Laval et Déat et tout ce beau monde s'entend pour que Hitler fasse le sale boulot, savoir terrasser le diable Staline...

Pardon, mais les documents anglaises sont formel.

1st March 1939, Sir Roger Backhouse, Chief of Naval Staff, wrote to the Cabinet that: "a series of hard blows against Italy at the start of hostilities could turn the whole course of war in Britain's favour". (PRO CAB 16/209, SAC1st Meeting 1st March 1939, CID Strategic Appreciations Sub-Commitee, p. 12. On 27 March 1939 the Join Planning Commitee stated that "during the next war against Germany and Italy the Royal Navy would have little difficulty in blockading Italy and attacking her shores" (PRO CAB 55/15, JP 382 Allied Plans against Italy, 27 March 1939).

Now the point is: every source says that the French had a quite modest enthusiasm the day of the declaration of war against Germany on 3 Sept. 1939 and the mood did not change later.

All the British documents about the next war gives as granted the French enthusiastic support at the coming next war at least since 23 January 1939, the day of the planned meeting between Admiral Bourragué and Captain Holland, the Royal Navy attaché in Paris, debating both happy the fact it was possible, at least, "to speak easy about the next war against Italy".(Archives de la Marine Française, Chateau de Vincennes, Pavillon de la Reine, Paris, EMG 2, TTE 28).
According the documents the alternatives are two only:
a) the French were enthusiast at the idea of a swift campaing against Italy confiding that the Germans would remain neutral or that Der Fuherer would be removed by an Allies symptetic putsch.
b) The British were sure that the French government would rally at their will as a single man as soon as they will whistle to fight both Italy and Germany.

In the b) case, anyway, it would be necessary to appreciate what induced Whitehall to be so sure in such a serious affair as a new European war about the Paris' attitude in spite of the recent people benevolent appreciation of the Munich settlement BEFORE the Prague invasion by the Germans.
Blackmail against some key members of the Daladier government of many menbers of the French parliament?

Sincerely

EC


PS Let me suggest you a reading of Williamson Murray, The role of Italy inn British Strategy 1938-1939, RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for defence Studies, Vol. 124, No. 3 September 1979.

PPSS "Miroton, miroton, miroton...c'est le chat qui fait ron-ron"

Ha ha, le Rusi. Very serious ! Ils ont même possédé le VRAI MASQUE Mortuaire de Napoléon...

RUSI means Royal United Services Institute (for Defence Studies).

How do you dare to smile if front of HM armed forces? The pure defenders of democracy! The shield against tiranny! The guarantee of good against evil (Jeanne d'Arc included, of course, is among the evil chieftains, like that damned Corse and much others not gentlemen and not chic types)!
This is a crime against the holyness of the Anglosaxon (superior) race! A revisionist act! A crime against humanity ect. ect.

Did you never read Macherot's Colonel Clifton?

A shocked (My Godness)

EC

PS I need at once a cup of tea and a bottle of gin.

Yes, indeed !

Enrico,the Italian issues are not the main ones, neither during the SWW nor among its antecedents. L'Italie n'est, à partir de 1936, guère autre chose qu'un chiffon agité par Hitler, en Espagne et ailleurs, pour dissimuler ses propres projets et détourner les foudres (ou menaces) adverses. Voire pour se faire bien voir de ses adversaires potentiels, comme vous-même le montrez en disant qu'il pouvait faire mine de défendre la France contre les provocatrices revendications mussoliniennes de la fin 38.

Il ne va évidemment pas au bout de la démarche... puisqu'il veut mener contre la France une rapide guerre d'écrasement et la prépare efficacement pour le printemps 1940.

PS.- Pour faire le lien avec notre débat sur Mers el-Kébir, l'idée que Churchill aurait joint l'efficacité à la morale en frappant plutôt (et plus tôt) la flotte italienne me semble pareillement fausse : c'est de la résolution anti-allemande qu'il fallait montrer, et rien d'autre ne s'offrait à court terme, pour frapper un grand coup, que la contestation de l'armistice franco-allemand en montrant qu'il mettait potentiellement toutes les ressources françaises dans les mains du Reich et qu'en tout cas l'Angleterre n'entendait ni tolérer ce risque, ni mendier respectueusement auprès de Vichy des mesures propres à l'écarter.

Tres interessant (molto interessante).

EC