Ciao,
the datas are correct and the same since 1971, there was a small material mistake in the 1941 totals which was found by Michele Gaetani in his excellent Stive ed egemonia published as a supplement by the Rivista Marittima on Nov. 2007 (I wrote the chapter V of that study), but it's about 900 instead of 300 tons delivered so statistically withour any relevance.
The whole story about the Axis supplies by sea to North Africa suffer some big (or, better, malicious) mistakes.
You can find an up to date full picture in:
http://www.marina.difesa.it/editoria/ri ... /art04.asp here I will limit myself to submit you some basic items:
the Axis services in North Africa needed a total of baout 65.000 t of supplies monthly
The harbours in Libya could handle at best that total. Sometimes they could receive higher amounts, but they were special occasions with special deliveries (like the tanks of a new armouder division) which had an higher ratio between weight and volume
The German and Italian troops and the colony received a media of 65.000 t monthly between June 1940 and May 1943.
There were always plenty of merchant vessels to supply North Africa, the Balkans ect. On 8 Sept. 1943 the Axis had still mopre than 1,8 millions of GWTs available while the tonnage necessary for for North Africa was always about 150.000 tons.
The fact that appprently only a fraction of the tonnage was charged is a natural cnsequence of the difference between weight and volumes. An assembled lorry need more space than a kit to mount at Tripoli, but the troops needed the lorry fast and even if there was a FIAT factory at Tripoli it could handle only a small numbers of kits. Abundance anytime of tonnage allowed anyway to use both space and weight at will within the harbours handling capacity.
The dark legend was born on September 1942 when Rommel suddenly asked Marshal Cavallero 150.000 tons of monthly supplies. It was an idiocy and the German Marshal knew well that fact, but both he and general Jodl had just concluded, being great prof, that Hitler's war had yet failed during the last weeks somewhere in the Caucasian mountains and that the last German chance was a new continental victory against the Western Allies like the one gained over France on Spring 1940. Africa had to be given up as Rommel did not believe anymore to a realistic chance to seize Suez. Italy too was not important, at least until the Pisa-Rimini line and could be abandoned easy to the enemy. What really mattered was the chance to defeat the British and the Americans in France along the shores of an invasion or during a later, classic campaign which materialized, at least, in the last Ardennnes offensive.
Cavallero would have to reply sharply that the 150.000 monthly quota was a trick to retreat from Africa, but he preferred to shut up and smile. Mussolini had ordered him to act this way, but it was an historical mistake which allowed many "historians" to believe at the British propaganda legend about Malta.
By the way the germans never sent from Europe mopre than 30-40.000 thousands tons monthly to North Africa and Italy had almost nothing to send there beyond what was yet shipped.
An other legend is the crippling nature of the Nov. 1941 losses at sea. Actually what was lost that month (the only one of the whole campaign with a per cent so hight) were general purpose cargos which did not affect the battle during the British Crusader offensive as the build-up for the planned new attack against Tobruch and Egypt had been completed on Sept. 1941 and the total stocks in Africa granted always about one-two months of autonomy. The Axis offensive had been delayed by the deferrment of the construction of the "Strada dell'Asse" around Tobruch beyind the range of the British artillery.
The total amount of military (both Italian and German) materials lost between 1 Aug. 1941 and 18 Jan. 1942 was:
25 20 mm guns; 67 anti tank guns (47 and 50 mm); 12 75 mm guns; 198 cars, 338 lorries and 46 tanks i.e. the materials for a single Italian division (the Sabratha) which had to be reformed after the early 1941 Graziani's disaster, but which was not going to be used during the next planned Nov. 1941 offensive as it was necessary to train the man again and which was completed by late January 1942 being employed during the next May and June 1942 offensive from Gazala to El Alamein.
(Source Lucio Ceva, La condotta italiana della guerra, -Cavallero's papers- ed. Felrinelli, Milan, 1975, page 199).
In literature is available a story about a Luftwaffe lack of gasoline on late Nov. 1941. but numbers do not allow such a statement. It's true that ther's a difference between stocks in depots and on the field, but the Italian navy deliveries by submarine of gasoline and munitions on Nov. Dec,. 1941 at Bardia allowed the Afrika Korps to supply itself just in time and on the spot (Batailles H-S n.15 les panzer de l'Afrika Korps).
This same submarine supplies (very small in front of the total big nuymners, but which must be confronted with the daily divisions consumptions at battle) can give us, however, an index of the real psycological categories of that time. When the first boat, the minelayer Zoea, arrived on Aug. 1941 at Bardia Rommerl paid her a visit, give the crew his small dog with the preyer to send it back to his family and almost cried "If this is not a single exploit we are save". After only six months of Africa the sense of isolation had prevailed over logic as that boat had just delivered little more than one hundred of tins of materials.
This same sense of isolation beyond the sea collapsed at least the German soldiers' will since April 1943 while the legend of the lack of supplies which had compromised Rommel's efforts at El Alamein and in Tunisia was the excuse used by the Germans to justify the pendig defeats in front of their allies and the public opinion then and later.
I limit myself here to quote that according general Westhpal and Bayerlein own declarations the last late Aug. 1942 offensive at El Alamein did not suffer for lack of petrol and that Hitler himself, in his Military conferences, rebuffed on Nov. 1942 his geenrals claims about the lack of fuel which would have hampered the Italian and German army at El Alamein saying that the 2.000 miles retreat until Agedabia had not been made filling the lorries' tanks with water.
Once we consider the fact that the Malta (and not only Malta) offensive against the Italian and German traffic (there was something, little, French traffic too on Dec. 1941-Jan. 1942, merci camrades) did not hamper the logistical supplies and the operations and that the general tonnage war did not affect the Italian and Axis war in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the final point is if the losses of personel and materials at sea had any decisive effect over the Italian and German forces durinf the following campaigns in Siclily and Italy. the answer is again no.
Only an half of the personnel sent in Afrcia by sea and by air and recorded as not arrived (about 27.000 men) died. The reminder were rescued and come back to Italy. In front of the only Italian army strenght on Summer 1943 (more than 3 millions of soldiers) the loss was sad. but far from fundamental. teh same for the Germans.
About the materials there was plenty of old artillery (the few modern one arrived safely in Libya and Tunisia) on Summer 1943; about the tanks the Italian losses were 453 M 13 and M 14 tanks, 57 l 3 and 18 75/18 Self propelled artillery guns. As the Sicily and Sardina logistic di not allow to supply more than an arm. brigade the difference was to have for Husky a tank regiment armed with M 14 instead of the R 35. Facing the Shermans the differecne would be anyway a little one. A landing in Sarfina would have found an Italian regiment armed totally with M 13 instad of a mix of M 13 and Somua. i confess to be unable to appreciate the difference.
About the warships balance, at least, until Nov. 1942 the numbers of the vessels lost by the British to supply Malta and to atack the enemy traffic and of the Italian and German ones expended to attack the enemy conovys bound for the Grand Harbour and to defend their own convoys are:
Royal Navy Regia Marina
Carriers 2 0
Cruisers 5 5
DDs 21 9
Torpedo boats 0 3
Fleet Minesweepers 2 0
Subchasers 2 0
MTBs 2 2 + 3 German ones
After it was no more the British war, but the American one. The a.m. losses, however, hid not hamper the Italian Navy efficiency than and later, included the situation during the Sicilian landings, when two Italian battleships (Littorio and Vittorio Veneto) with a division of light cruisers and a dozen of DDs had on the other side of the hill to face six British battleships, two fleet carriers and an armada of cruisers and destoryers. The British concentration had been allowed by the lent by the USN of two modern BBs at Scapa Flow (Alabama and South Dakota).
Salut les gars
EC